From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!pindor Thu Apr 16 11:33:26 EDT 1992
Article 4985 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!pindor
>From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Message-ID: <1992Apr8.173500.26844@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca>
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Organization: UTCS Public Access
References: <1992Apr1.150750.9618@cs.yale.edu> <1992Apr2.181357.25444@psych.toronto.edu> <511@tdatirv.UUCP> <1992Apr7.222046.16470@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 1992 17:35:00 GMT

In article <1992Apr7.222046.16470@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
......
>
>>It will only be through research on living minds and on computational
>>modelling that a detailed model can possibly be derived, or be shown
>>to be impossible.
>
>What *empirical* evidence would count?  Remember that we are arguing over
>whether having the appropriate behaviour is sufficient evidence for
>having a mind.  I may be wrong, but I see *no* way in which this is
>amenable to empirical investigation.  
>
Is a statement that a given entity (a human, a robot, an alien, a rock, etc)
has a mind or not amenable to empirical investigation? I presume you agree that
it is. 'Appropriate behaviour' (whatever it might be) is empirical evidence of 
some sort, do you agree? Then it is a simple matter to see if conclusions
drawn from this evidence coincide with whatever evidence you suggest to use
for deciding whether an entity has a mind.  
The problem is that you DO NOT HAVE any method of deciding whether an entity
has a mind, apart from 'appropriate behaviour', and you do not like this one.
To escape from this dilemma, you propose to resort to pure speculations, which
can be done with covered eyes and plugged ears. 
Please tell me, if you are faced with an entity, is it having a mind an
objective fact or a matter of personal taste? If the latter, there is no point
of discussing it. If the former, then there should be empirical evidence to 
base the decision on. Or do you have other suggestions?

>>And I have yet to see an argument supporting 'no semantics from syntax'
>>that does not equally apply to the human brain.  No one has yet provided
>>a compelling, observatianally verified, model of how the *brain* could
>>generate semantics in any other way.
>>
>
>The difference between the brain and computers is that we *know* the 
>brain produces meaning.  We *don't* know that computers do.  Even if we

Is this (brain producing meaning) an objective empirical fact, or subjective
'knowledge' arrived at by introspection? If the second, you cannot know
whether computers produce it or not, because your introspection does not extend
to computers. If the first, then please specify criteria used to arrive at
this conclusion. Then we will be able to see if this does or does not apply 
to computers.

>don't know *how* the brain does it, we *can* rule out ways in which it
>doesn't, e.g., angels dancing on pinheads.  The claim being made is that
>we have independent reasons for ruling out functionalism as well, namely,
>that syntax is insufficient of itself to yield semantics.  The truth of this
>claim is independent of whether we *do* know how the brain does what it does. 
>
>
>- michael
>


-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca


