From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!spool.mu.edu!olivea!uunet!psinntp!sunic!seunet!kullmar!pkmab!ske Tue Apr  7 23:24:15 EDT 1992
Article 4931 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Challenge
Keywords: Searle, Chinese Room
Message-ID: <6742@pkmab.se>
Date: 4 Apr 92 05:01:15 GMT
Article-I.D.: pkmab.6742
References: <centaur.700790865@cc.gatech.edu> <6419@skye.ed.ac.uk> <1992Apr1.150750.9618@cs.yale.edu>
Organization: Peridot Konsult i Mellansverige AB, Oerebro, Sweden
Lines: 77

In article <1992Apr1.150750.9618@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:
>I have been mildly surprised by the reaction to my "challenge"
>regarding the Chinese Room.  It turns out that no one is willing
>actually to defend the argument.  Everyone actually wants to talk
>about something else:
>
>  In article <6419@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>
>  >If we're going to try to line up the arguments on both sides
>  >(as I think McDermott suggests), let's do it for the Turing Test
>  >too.  A defeat for the TT would make the entire discussion much
>  >more reasonable, IMHO.
>
>Michael Gemar (in e-mail) suggested that the CR was not, after all,
>the issue, but syntax vs. semantics was.  Christopher Green made the
>same point, in a posting I seem to have misplaced.  

Oh, so they know the final word on what the issue is, indeed?

I might be willing to participate in a debate of the suggested kind that
takes on a broader scope of this general issue. For instance, the above
mentioned people could argue for the position that "computers couldn't
possibly possess minds", using all arguments they find relevant, not
limited to the Chinese Room argument, while I would take on the position
"you're wrong, there is no proof that computers can't have minds".

I would not be willing to argue the position that "I can prove that
computers can have minds", though, which is perhaps the position which
the above mentioned people believe the rest of us are arguing from. Is
there anyone at all here who would be brave/foolish enough to take on that
position? I don't think it is possible to win with that position. Even
if we could demonstrate a real computer with a "real" mind according to
us (which we can't), it would still be as possible as ever to claim that
"it's a computer - it can't be a real mind", or some lesser version
there-of. An empirically verified explanation of how the human brains
work (which we don't have either) would convert some people, I think, but
not even that is water-tight.  I think the problem to a great extent
involves how we choose to define meaning and mind and other terms (i.e.,
what attributes of these concept we take for granted, and base our further
arguments on), and there simply is no way to "prove" a definition. Some
definitions can be shown not to lead to the expected consequences, though.

I also think that the failure even to agree on the _issue_ for this proposed
more formal debate, provides the definite demonstration that people have been
attributing the wrong positions to each other, and that there have been more
positions involved in the debate than some have allowed for in their responses,
as I have been trying to point out to some of the debaters, mostly unto deaf
ears. The pro-Searle side have been interpreting most of their contenders as
advocating Strong AI, ignoring the possibility that some of them may have
been more concerned with just pointing out loop-holes in the anti-Strong AI
arguments, and the anti-Searle side have perhaps mostly interpreted the
pro-Searle side as primarily defending the Chinese Room, ignoring other
points being made. Of course, sloppy arguments and misunderstandings abound
on both sides, too, and I mean _both_ sides, but that's only to be expected
in an open forum like this, I think, and is nothing to be upset about.

As I said, I might be willing to participate in a debate with a wider
scope, as suggested by the pro-Searle side. But if we now widen the issue
from being "the Chinese Room" to "syntax vs. semantics", I would expect a
significant risk that the Chinese Room will still be invoked rather quickly
as one of the arguments against Strong AI, and then we'd be back at the
same point again. Therefore, I have to ask: would the pro-Searle side (all
of the participants, not only some) be willing to agree to leave the Chinese
Room out of the argument, as being insufficient for proving the point? If
they are not willing to do that, then I think we would still need to argue
that out before going on to any wider questions.

I would of course also be willing to participate in the debate on the
Chinese Room alone, as originally envisaged, but that doesn't work as
long as no-one is willing to write up the Chinese Room position. (If I
would do that myself, it would just become another one-sided article in
the overall flod, and besides, I don't have that much time.)

-- 
Kristoffer Eriksson, Peridot Konsult AB, Hagagatan 6, S-703 40 Oerebro, Sweden
Phone: +46 19-13 03 60  !  e-mail: ske@pkmab.se
Fax:   +46 19-11 51 03  !  or ...!{uunet,mcsun}!mail.swip.net!kullmar!pkmab!ske


