From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!christo Tue Apr  7 23:24:11 EDT 1992
Article 4923 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Apr2.132116.26024@cs.ucf.edu> <1992Apr2.202206.25306@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Apr3.084449.10635@husc3.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <1992Apr5.205728.11406@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Sun, 5 Apr 1992 20:57:28 GMT

In article <1992Apr3.084449.10635@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>Kripke's argument against mind-brain identity trivially lifts
>to bear against the thesis of supervenience.  But, of course, it would

Could you lay this out a little more fully. Would it make any difference
if we constrained the accessibility relation to only those worlds that 
have the same causal laws as the actual world?
Thanks.
-cdg-
.


-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
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