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Article 4903 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Message-ID: <1992Apr3.174726.26660@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 3 Apr 92 17:47:26 GMT
References: <45844@dime.cs.umass.edu> <1992Apr2.202642.25800@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <46007@dime.cs.umass.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 31

In article <46007@dime.cs.umass.edu> orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:

>Perhaps we should distinguish between:
>	1. Putnam being incorrect (his proof failing);
>	2. Putnam's proofs not establishing the philosophical
>	   points he desires;
>	3. Putnam's proof not establishing the philosophical
>	   points others desire.
>When you say Putnam's proof "fails," I don't think you mean that
>it is technically incorrect (do you?), according to his (never-stated) 
>definition of "realization."  Rather you mean it fails under your 
>definition of "implementation."  And further, to establish his
>philosophical points, something like your notion of "implementation"
>is necessary.

Well, as I said earlier, this is a purely "semantic" point, in the
pejorative sense.  One can say that the proof succeeds with some
definition of "realization" if one likes, but this isn't a
definition that most functionalists would recognize.  Very few
functionalists would hold that being this kind of "realization"
of an FSA suffices for cognitive properties.

I note that Maudlin's "Computation and Consciousness" (Journal of
Philosophy, 1989) -- another funny-implementation anti-functionalist
paper, but more sophisticated -- takes it as a given that
implementations have to satisfy strong conditionals.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


