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Article 4901 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: syntax and semantics
Message-ID: <1992Apr03.164328.8107@spss.com>
Date: 3 Apr 92 16:43:28 GMT
References: <6419@skye.ed.ac.uk> <1992Apr1.150750.9618@cs.yale.edu> <1992Apr2.181357.25444@psych.toronto.edu>
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In article <1992Apr2.181357.25444@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu 
(Michael Gemar) writes:
>As I have also noted recently, I am no longer convinced that the Chinese Room 
>example, as a demonstration of the axiom that syntax can't yield semantics,
>appropriately deals with the Systems Reply.  This is *not* to say that I
>necessarily have been converted to Functionalism, as I think the axiom is
>supported by the distinction made by linguists and philosophers between
>syntax and semantics, *and* by the fact that AI advocates offer no
>explanation of how the latter arises from the former, except faith.

Whoa there-- I don't think you can drag the linguists onto your bandwagon.
Linguists and philosophers don't seem to use "semantics" in the same way.
When linguists talk about "semantics", or a certain MIT linguist talks about
"the semantic component of a grammar", they have in mind something about as
formal, symbolic, and computable as the thing they call "syntax."

Searle seems to use "syntactic" to mean "formal", or "manipulating...
symbols [with] precisely stated rules."  "Semantics" he seems to equate
with reference.  Perhaps these are standard usages in philosophy, but they
would not allow one to make sense of most discussions of syntax and
semantics in linguistics.

Would it be a fair restatement of Searle's axiom, to say that "Formal symbol
manipulation cannot of itself comprise or yield reference"?


