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Article 4885 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: silber@orfeo.Eng.Sun.COM (Eric Silber)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: The 'Big Bang' and the origin of 'mathematical  objects'
Message-ID: <ktmtr2INNso8@exodus.Eng.Sun.COM>
Date: 2 Apr 92 21:06:42 GMT
References: <kth7fnINNflu@exodus.Eng.Sun.COM> <1992Apr2.181440.11808@guinness.idbsu.edu>
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In article <1992Apr2.181440.11808@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>In article <kth7fnINNflu@exodus.Eng.Sun.COM> silber@orfeo.Eng.Sun.COM (Eric Silber) writes:
>>
>> Apparently, the reason mathematical realists call 'it' "mathematical-
>> realism", is that they assert the objective existence of mathematical
>> objects as part of the totality of the universe (as distinguished from
>> "spiritual objects" from beyond the great beyond).  Thus,
>> "real mathematical objects" must be explainable, predictable consequences
>> of a complete theory of the origin of the universe.
>
>	Mathematical objects are not physical--the "Big Bang" is
>irrelevant to their existence or non-existence.  They are also
>eternal (they have no relationship to time) and therefore the question
>of a physical beginning for such objects makes no sense.

I think that as soon as you posit the existence of mathematical "OBJECTS"
(separate from human ideas), then you have a responsibility to respond
to ontological questions about them such as "how did they get here?".
Cosmological theories seek to encompass the entire universe.  Now, if
you assert that "real mathematical objects" are independent of the 
universe, I think you are asserting a clearly paradoxical position.
We are in touch with these "mathematical objects", yet they are not
part of the universe?  But the universe is the TOTALITY of all and
everything that IS.  So I refer you back to my original position,
namely, that ultimately, in order to support "mathematical realism",
mathematical realists will have to show how the existence of real
mathematical objects is entailed by some cosmological theory.


