From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Mon Dec 16 11:01:34 EST 1991
Article 2087 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Searle and the Chinese Room
Message-ID: <1991Dec13.043124.19413@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <YAMAUCHI.91Dec5040116@heron.cs.rochester.edu> <1991Dec5.191043.10565@psych.toronto.edu> <44801@mimsy.umd.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 1991 04:31:24 GMT

In article <44801@mimsy.umd.edu> kohout@cs.umd.edu (Robert Kohout) writes:

>I stop reading for a few weeks, and suddenly we're back to this CR
>discussion again. Oh well....
>
>It seems to me that this so-called "logical" aspect to Searle's position
>is flawed. That is, the meanings of the words "syntax" and "semantics"
>are conflated. No one has ever shown, for example, that the semantic
>representations of the human mind are NOT produced by mechanisms which
>can be accurately modeled on a digital machine. What proof is there that
>what these philosophers call semantic is in fact "super-syntactic"?
>Is this not merely an appeal to intuitions which give far too much 
>credit to semantics and far too little to syntax? That is, isn't
>it an appeal to the human prejudice that we _must_ be more than
>a mere machine.

Searle claims that the Chinese Room demonstration *does* show that
syntactic (digital) operations are not sufficient for understanding.
I think that you are dismissing philosophical analysis far too quickly.

>I fully realize that syntactic manipulations have limitations, and
>I do *not* propose that they are sufficient to capture the essense
>of intelligence. However, I am unconvinced by what I consider to
>be little more than sophistry, and I particularly object to the
>notion that these arguments are somehow logical. They are not. They
>gain most, if not all, of their weight from our inability to clearly
>and unambiguously differentiate syntax and semantics.

Well then, the job of Searle's opponents is to present a more coherent
analysis of syntax and semantics than he has done.  It is not at all
clear to me why you choose to label such style of argumentation
"sophistry". 

[I wrote:]

>>It seems to me that, unless strong AI proponents can provide a coherent
>>explanation of why Searle's logical argument fails, the field as a whole
>>rests on a profound misunderstanding.
>>
>
>Why do people insist upon putting the entire burden of the philosophy
>of mind upon a group of people who should be more properly be classified
>as engineers than philosphers? 

Because such people continue to make philosophical claims.  I'm with you --
leave philosophy to those who do it for a living...

> Personally, I fail to see how the
>Chinese Room argument impinges upon AI practioners in any way whatsoever.
>If I can build the room, I really don't care whether or not you are
>going to say that it (or the computer which implements it) REALLY
>understands. That is useless hairsplitting, as far as I'm concerned.

Then you fall into the weak AI camp, with which Searle has no argument.
If you only want to build machines to do neat things, then there's no
problem.  It's only when "a group of people who should be more properly
be classified as engineers than philosophers" start to say that such
machines *understand* that Searle gets uppitty.  Philosophers are
*very* concerned about "hairsplitting" -- it's what they get paid
to do...

- michael



