From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!bronze!chalmers Mon Dec 16 11:01:16 EST 1991
Article 2054 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!bronze!chalmers
>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Wanted: Chinese Room reference list
Message-ID: <1991Dec12.015230.16218@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1991Dec11.232405.15917@nynexst.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 91 01:52:30 GMT
Lines: 167

In article <1991Dec11.232405.15917@nynexst.com> gene@nynexst.com (Gene Miller) writes:

>    I would like to compile a list of significant articles and
>    books that deal with the Chinese Room debate.

>From my bibliography in the philosophy of mind/cognition/AI.  These are
in approximate chronological order.

1.6 The Chinese Room (Searle) [39]
-----------------------------

Searle, J.R. 1980.  Minds, brains and programs.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences
3:417-57.
  Implementing a program is not sufficient for mentality, as I can e.g.
  implement a "Chinese-speaking" program without understanding Chinese.
  So strong AI is false, and no program is sufficient for consciousness.

Searle, J.R. 1984.  _Minds, Brains and Science_.  Harvard UP.
  "Axiomatizes" the underlying argument: Syntax isn't sufficient for semantics.

Searle, J.R. 1987.  Minds and brains without programs.  In (Blakemore, ed)
_Mindwaves_.  Blackwell.
  Same stuff.  Mind is a high-level physical property of brain.

Searle, J.R. 1990.  Is the brain's mind a computer program?  Scientific
American 262(1):26-31.
  The Chinese Room, ten years on.  More of the same.

Hofstadter, D.R. 1981.  Reflections.  In (Hofstadter/Dennett, eds) _The Mind's
I_, pp. 373-382.  Basic Books.
  Searle is committing a level confusion.

Searle, J.R./Dennett, D.C. 1982.  The myth of the computer: An exchange.  NY
Rev Books.
  Arguing over various points, including bits vs. slips of paper.

Double, R. 1983.  Searle, programs and functionalism.  Nature and System
5:107-14.

Fields, C. 1984.  Double on Searle's Chinese Room.  Nature and System 6:51-54.

Russow, L. 1984.  Unlocking the Chinese Room.  Nature and System 6:221-8.

Carleton, L. 1984.  Programs, language understanding, and Searle.  Synthese
59:219-30.

Cole, D. 1984.  Thought and thought experiments.  Philosophical Studies
45:431-44.
  Lots of thought experiments like Searle's, against Searle.  Searle's argument
  is like Leibniz's argument, with level confusion etc.  Good but patchy.

Rapaport, W. 1984.  Searle's experiments with thought.  Philosophy of Science
53:271-9.
  Comments on Cole, and general stuff on syntax/semantics.

Sharvy, R. 1985.  Searle on programs and intentionality.  Canadian Journal of
Philosophy Supplement 11:39-54.
  Argues against Searle, but misses the point for the most part.

Hanna, P. 1985.  Causal powers and cognition.  Mind 94:53-63.
  Argues that Searle is confused, and underestimates computers.  Weak.

Rey, G. 1986.  What's really going on in Searle's `Chinese Room'.
Philosophical Studies 50:169-85.
  Weak Systems reply; causal semantics; wide and narrow content.  Patchy --
  best part is showing tension between Searle's positive/negative proposals.

Sloman, A. 1986.  Did Searle attack Strong Strong AI or Weak Strong AI?  In
(Cohn) _Artificial Intelligence and Its Applications_.

Thagard, P. 1986.  The emergence of meaning: An escape from Searle's Chinese
Room. Behaviourism.

Dennett, D.C. 1987.  Fast thinking.  In _The Intentional Stance_.  MIT Press.
  Argues with Searle on many points.  A little weak.

Maloney, J.C. 1987.  The right stuff.  Synthese 70:349-72.
  Defends Searle against all kinds of objections.  Exhaustive but flawed.

Boden, M. 1988.  Escaping from the Chinese Room.  In _Computer Models of Mind_.
Cambridge UP.
  Computers can have understanding/semantics, procedurally.

Moor, J. 1988.  The pseudorealization fallacy and the Chinese Room argument.
in (Fetzer, ed) _Aspects of AI_.  Dordrecht-Reidel.
  Computational systems must also meet performance criteria.

Harnad, S. 1989.  Minds, machines and Searle.  JETAI 1:5-25.
  Non-symbolic function is necessary for mentality.  Trying hard to work out a
  theory of why the Chinese Room shows what it does.  Nice but wrong.

Dyer, M. 1990.  Intentionality and computationalism: minds, machines, Searle
and Harnad.  JETAI 2:303-19.
  Reply to Searle/Harnad: systems reply, level confusion, etc.

Harnad, S. 1990.  Lost in the hermeneutical hall of mirrors.  JETAI 2:321-27.
  Reply to Dyer: on the differences between real and as-if intentionality.

Dyer, M. 1990.  Finding lost minds.  JETAI 2:329-39.
  Reply to Harnad: symbols, other minds, and physical embodiment of algorithms.

Jacquette, D. 1989.  Searle's intentionality thesis.  Synthese 80:267-75.
  Searle's view => intentional causation is not efficient causation.

Jacquette, D. 1989.  Adventures in the Chinese Room.  Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 49:605-23.
  If we had microfunctional correspondence, CR would fail.  Also points about
  the status of intentionality, abstract or biological.  A bit weak.

Searle, J.R. 1989.  Reply to Jacquette.  Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 49:701-8.
  Jacquette misses the point of the argument.  Also, biological and abstract
  intentionality are quite compatible.

Jacquette, D. 1990.  Fear and loathing (and other intentional states) in
Searle's Chinese Room.  Philosophical Psychology 3:287-304.
  Reply to Searle on CR, central control, biological intentionality & dualism.

Seidel, A. 1989.  Chinese Rooms A, B and C.  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
20:167-73.
  A person running the program, with interpretations at hand, would understand.
  Point-missing.

Suits, D. 1989.  Out of the Chinese Room.  Computing and Philosophy Newsletter
4:1-7.
  Story about homunculi within homunculi.  Fun.

Newton, N. 1989.  Machine understanding and the Chinese Room.  Philosophical
Psychology 2:207-15.
  A program can possess intentionality, even if not consciousness.

Cam, P. 1990.  Searle on Strong AI.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy
68:103-8.
  Criticizes Searle's "conclusion" that brains are needed for intentionality.
  Also, even a homunculus has intentional states.  Misinterpretation.

Jahren, N. 1990.  Can semantics be syntactic?  Synthese 82:309-28.
  Against Rapaport's Korean Room argument -- syntax isn't enough.

Korb, K. 1990.  Searle's AI program.  Draft.
  CR does not succeed as an argument about semantics; only, perhaps, as an
  argument about consciousness.

Roberts, L. 1990.  Searle's extension of the Chinese Room to connectionist
machines. JETAI 2:185-7.
  In arguing against serial/parallel distinction, Searle becomes a formalist.
  Nice point.

Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1990.  Could a machine think?  Scientific
American 262(1):32-37.
  Yes: not through Classical AI but through brain-like AI.  Argues with
  syntax/semantics point using electromagnetism/luminance analogy.

Fodor, J.A. 1991.  Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room.  In (Rosenthal, ed) _The
Nature of Mind_.  Oxford UP.
  CR isn't even implementing a TM, because it doesn't use proximal causation.

Chalmers, D.J. 1992.  Subsymbolic computation and the Chinese Room.  In
(Dinsmore, ed) _The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap_.
Erlbaum.
  On the link between CR and symbolic/subsymbolic computation.  Connx reps are
  not computational tokens, so the force of the CR intuition is weakened.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


