From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Mon Dec 16 11:01:08 EST 1991
Article 2040 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Searle and the Chinese Room
Message-ID: <1991Dec11.203452.9419@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1991Dec5.210724.12480@cs.yale.edu> <1991Dec8.192843.6951@psych.toronto.edu> <1991Dec11.170157.27053@cs.yale.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 1991 20:34:52 GMT


In article <1991Dec11.170157.27053@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:

[enormous amount of exchange between Drew and me deleted, although I don't
 believe the context is necessary for the point I'm making.  Drew is welcome
 to correct me, of course...]

>The bottom line is that semantics is epiphenomenal, although useful in
>explaining why certain syntactic systems maneuver through a world of
>zebras so well.  It does not matter that syntax =/= semantics, because
>semantics plays no role in our use of internal symbol systems.

*SEMANTICS IS EPIPHENOMINAL????!!!!!!!*

I find it nearly impossible to believe that *you* believe this.  Is 
understanding merely "epiphenominal"?


Even if you *do* believe that semantics plays *no causal role* in
cognition (a position which, I must admit, goes against *my* intuitions)
then you *still* need to account for why we *believe* we have semantics and
understanding.  I believe that there is no way to do this *without*
granting semantics causal efficacy, and hence undermining your assertion.

It is quite possible that I have read more into your statement than you
intended, or have misinterpreted it completely.  If so, please clarify it for
me.

>Sorry to go on at such length, but I think it's important to clarify
>what the disagreement is.
>
>    Searle's point of the Chinese Room example is to show that
>   >while you may know what an English symbol refers to, you do *not* know
>   >what a Chinese symbol refers to, despite the fact that the behaviour is
>   >the same, that the symbols are used appropriately in both cases.
>
>At the risk of repeating myself (and McCarthy), it matters not whether
>*I* know, so long as the virtual person instantiated by the program knows.

But how do *they* know?  And what the heck do you *mean* by "virtual person"?
And why can't *I*, by performing the appropriate operations, instantiate
one myself?

- michael



