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Article 1970 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle and the Chinese Room
Message-ID: <1991Dec9.091317.2145@milton.u.washington.edu>
Date: 9 Dec 91 09:13:17 GMT
Article-I.D.: milton.1991Dec9.091317.2145
References: <1991Dec7.073933.6258@husc3.harvard.edu> <1991Dec8.062341.28537@milton.u.washington.edu> <1991Dec8.164459.6318@husc3.harvard.edu>
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle
Lines: 40

In article <1991Dec8.164459.6318@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>In article <1991Dec8.062341.28537@milton.u.washington.edu> 
>forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis) writes:
>>I'm not sure I want to consider the semantic role of volition.  Why should I
>>do so?  Does this have more to do with your concept of "agency"?  Is this
>>an introduction of willfull non-determinism?  It may be that in my teleology
>>this is limited to the deity.  Is our discussion of semantics limited to
>>those who believe in free will?  I really doubt this.
>
>Our discussion of semantics is not limited to those who believe in free
>will, but to those who practice it; if I wanted to talk to the Almighty, I
>wouldn't use the net.  Still, if you'd rather, I could interpret what
>appears to be your words as His own utterances; still, the semantic role of
>His volition would be relevant to our discussion.  Semantics without agency
>is simply inconceivable.

Not only can I conceive of semantics without agency but I have done so.  What
I have conceived may be malformed but it has matured to such an extent that
it has offspring of its own.

I don't understand how one can consider a theory about semantics without
a prior theory about agency if the latter is so integral to the former as
to make the former inconceivable without the latter.  If I grant this then
there can be no argument which gives the former to our machines without
this theory I have yet to see--if I grant that agency is required for
semantics I have given away the game.  

I have always assumed that the semantics of a symbol exist independent of
the agent using it (I'm not sure I'm using agency in the way you mean it.) 

It turns out my teleology doesn't involve "agency" (as I think you define
it) at all.  All my uncaused causes are random.   Am I using "denote" and
"symbol" incorrectly when within my world view I think of a symbol as an
entity which denotes another entity?  Can an entity use a symbol and not
be an agent?  Can an entity use a symbol without denoting?  What is
a symbol if it does not denote?

Thanks for your time.

--gary forbis@u.washington.edu


