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Article 2448 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Ignore Searle and be happier
Message-ID: <1991Dec30.205545.875@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1991Dec30.193339.28438@mp.cs.niu.edu> <1991Dec30.194943.25819@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1991Dec30.203517.30168@mp.cs.niu.edu>
Date: Mon, 30 Dec 91 20:55:45 GMT
Lines: 21

In article <1991Dec30.203517.30168@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:

> Then it seems to me you are saying that is that it is reasonable for the
>size of a heap of sand to vary when the amount of sand and/or the shape
>factor of the heap varies, but it is not reasonable for the size of the
>heap to vary when the volume and shape are held fixed.
>
> I don't disagree with this.  But I don't see that it gets you anywhere
>either.

The point is that if one accepts that fading states of consciousness with
fixed functional organization is unreasonable, then (by construction of
a continuum of cases) one is forced to the conclusion that anything
functionally isomorphic to me in the right way -- e.g. a silicon
duplication of my neural structure, or a Chinese-room duplication
(given computability assumptions) -- would be conscious, contra Searle.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


