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Article 2407 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Ignore QM and be happy
Message-ID: <61068@netnews.upenn.edu>
Date: 25 Dec 91 17:49:31 GMT
References: <1991Dec24.054745.16805@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <61056@netnews.upenn.edu> <1991Dec25.043314.19060@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
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Reply-To: weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener)
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In-reply-to: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)

In article <1991Dec25.043314.19060@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>, chalmers@bronze (David Chalmers) writes:
>I'm not (here) concerned with establishing that brain function is
>computable.  Rather, I'm concerned with the question raised by
>Searle's Chinese room argument: whether, given that brain function
>is computable, a simulation would be conscious.

Such a refutation[*] should be independent of the means of simulation, yet
you have been relying heavily on computability assumptions about neurons
to box Searle's ears with the paradox of the heap.

[*]As you claimed in your original article: "this can be turned into an
argument against Searle that has some force."
-- 
-Matthew P Wiener (weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu)


