From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usenet.coe.montana.edu!milton!forbis Thu Dec 26 23:57:41 EST 1991
Article 2325 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Xref: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca comp.ai.philosophy:2325 sci.philosophy.tech:1548 sci.philosophy.meta:889
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usenet.coe.montana.edu!milton!forbis
>From: forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis)
Subject: Re: The Return of the Son of the Flame-Free Putnam Thread (was re: Virtual Person?)
Message-ID: <1991Dec20.221220.26233@milton.u.washington.edu>
Keywords: intension vs. extension, the name relation, model theory
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle
References: <1991Dec16.163345.6653@husc3.harvard.edu> <1991Dec18.200619.29195@cs.yale.edu> <1991Dec20.134023.6825@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: Fri, 20 Dec 1991 22:12:20 GMT

An explanation by way of a complaint and a very brief comment.

In article <1991Dec20.134023.6825@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>In article <1991Dec18.200619.29195@cs.yale.edu> 
>mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:

MZ:
>Putnam's paradox destroys extensionality as we know it.  The only
>extensional resolution I can see involves the adoption of a Churchian
>transfinite intensional hierarchy of extensional languages, the first level
>of which is comparable to the Carnap and Montague systems in their entirety.

Don't get me wrong.  I know there are times talking is such shorthand helps
cut the number of words used but when you do so make it very hard for untrained
but (self-proclaimed) intelligent people like me to understand what you mean.
Though I have followed this room from the start I haven't grasped all of
the points made.  I do not have photographic memory so do not remember stuff
which I have not grasped due to esoteric verbage.  If I latter grasp the 
concepts I may refer to them and it gets annoying to be told this stuff was
completely explained some months ago and does not bear repeating.

DMD:
>>When doing knowledge
>>representation, it is often helpful to ask the question, *Could* the
>>real world be a model of this theory?  It's just crazy to suppose that
>>you could ever get back the answer that the real world is the *only*
>>model.  And formal semantics sheds little light on how a creature
>>living in the same world with George Bush could come to manipulate
>>symbols that refer to him.  Presumably explaining how that happens
>>would require following causal chains that take us out of the realm of
>>model theory.

MZ:
>The real question is of a wholly different nature: how can we explain the
>empirically and introspectively observable fact that a creature living in
>the same world with George Bush succeeds in manipulating symbols that refer
>to him, given that it is manifestly incapable of following the causal
>chains connecting the token `George Bush' with the current President of the
>United States?

I'm not sure you can refer to "empirically and introspectively observable"
facts at the same time.  Before you refer to empirical facts about George Bush
you must assume a causal link.  Introspectively observable facts don't give
you the right to assume such causal links.  I'm sure you could snow me by
refering to some theorem by name.  It is up to you to decide if such is
more important than communicating.  If communicating isn't important then
please feel free to ignore this without response.

--gary forbis 


