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Article 2287 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle's response to silicon brain?
Message-ID: <1991Dec19.184204.36982@spss.com>
Date: 19 Dec 91 18:42:04 GMT
References: <40825@dime.cs.umass.edu> <1991Dec18.173854.3551@spss.com> <40869@dime.cs.umass.edu>
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In article <40869@dime.cs.umass.edu> yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu (victor yodaiken) writes:
>And, what's the experimental program of the anti-phrenology theorists?
>One does not have to propound an alternate theory in order to justify
>pointing out errors. 

Yes, one does.  According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, phrenology was
invented by an anatomist, and had some popular appeal, but was discredited
by "later scientific research."  That's research, muchacho, not jawboning
on Internet.

I suggest you read some Feynman yourself, particularly his discussions on
quantum mechanics and "common sense."  You don't create theories in quantum
mechanics by sitting there thinking, particularly since what seems natural
and obvious is simply not true on the quantum level.  You create theories
and experiments and see what happens.

If you don't like a theory, propose an experiment which will disprove it.
This is what Einstein did with quantum mechanics, proposing the Einstein-
Podalsky-Rosen experiment.  (Unfortunately for Einstein, the experiment,
once actually undertaken, confirmed rather than disproved quantum mechanics.)

>Perhaps there is no reasonable theory of thought
>at present. It is perfectly reasonable to argue that until further progress
>is made in neurology, linguistics, vision, etc.  constructing grand theories of 
>the underlying mechanisms of human thought is a dubious exercise.

That cuts both ways. What are Searle's postulation of "physical, causal 
properties", or Penrose's speculations on quantum effects in the mind,
but (very vague) theories of the underlying mechanisms of human thought?
For that matter, if there is "no reasonable theory of thought", Searle's
blithe assumptions about the independence of syntax and semantics and
the physicality of mental phenomena rest on pretty shaky ground.


