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Article 2273 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: jkm@mbunix.mitre.org (Millen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle's response to silicon brain
Message-ID: <1991Dec19.141418.1132@linus.mitre.org>
Date: 19 Dec 91 14:14:18 GMT
Article-I.D.: linus.1991Dec19.141418.1132
References: <40822@dime.cs.umass.edu> <1991Dec18.193242.10535@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <BSIMON.91Dec19071828@elvis.stsci.edu>
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Let's take another look at the internal combustion engine
analogy, in the context of the general argument:

> Still, I think that this can be turned into an argument against
> Searle that has some force.  First, we have to replace the neurons
> one by one instead of all at once.  Second, we can allow that
> instead of replacing them by silicon, we can replace them by
> *anything* that's functionally equivalent...

The fact is, that various parts of automobile engines have been
computerized, viz., fuel injection, quite successfully.  On the
other hand, it is also clear that certain substitutions will fail;
if you try to change the explosion in the cylinder into a
computer simulation, the engine stops working.  (It is
interesting that one could do this with one cylinder, and the
engine will still work, but when all cylinders are replaced,
the engine no longer functions; the brain also has redundant
structure.)

Seeing that this happens with an autombile engine makes it less
paradoxical to say that it might also happen when a progressive
replacement of neurons with other informationally-identical
circuits is attempted.  I don't think Searle or anyone else
really understands exactly which brain structure is critical
or why; his position is simply that he thinks there *is* one,
while others don't think so.  The auto engine analogy, in my
view, makes it plausible to maintain that this is an empirical
matter, which will not be settled by logical argument.

-Jon Millen


