From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!tdatirv!sarima Thu Dec 26 23:57:03 EST 1991
Article 2267 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Virtual Person? (was re: Searle and the Chine
Keywords: personal identity
Message-ID: <335@tdatirv.UUCP>
Date: 19 Dec 91 00:54:52 GMT
References: <1991Dec13.204324.27948@cs.yale.edu> <1991Dec15.023122.6582@husc3.harvard.edu> <1991Dec16.181202.526@cs.yale.edu> <1991Dec16.163345.6653@husc3.harvard.edu> <!!5q-0+@rpi.edu>
Reply-To: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
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In article <!!5q-0+@rpi.edu> floydb@aix.rpi.edu (Barry B Floyd) writes:
|Resent postings haven't done much to clarify what seem to be the interesting
|points raised by a "virtual person"...
| 
|Epistemically one might adequately argue that Searle's CR person may be
|considered some sort of "virtual person". Ontologically it would seem that
|Searle is not interested in "virtual people". 
| 
|It has been suggested that volition is one of many criteria worthy of 
|considering when evaluating the personhood of a CR type fabrication. Is
|this strictly necessary from an epistemic perspective? Please define
|volition, if it is to be considered.
| 
|Sematics has frequently been raised as an issue of importance. Is it
|merely that has been used as curse between combatants, is it also a
|criteria worth considering with respect to "virtual persons". Is it     
|necessary to further define "virtual" with respect to persons and/or
|"persons" per se? 

I would say that a virtual person would have all of the cognitive and
volitional processes that a 'normal' person has.

There, that dodges the questions nicely.

Really, I see no reason to deny the Chinsese Room any of the attributes
of personhood.

I consider semantics to be a necessary precondition to producing a convincing,
unrestricted dialog with human beings.  [Eliza only works if you keep
to a very restricted dialog pattern].  So, I would take the success of the
CR as a priori evidence that it had semantic processes.
-- 
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uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)



