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Article 2166 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu (victor yodaiken)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Scaled up slug brains
Message-ID: <40705@dime.cs.umass.edu>
Date: 16 Dec 91 16:52:20 GMT
References: <12709@pitt.UUCP> <40677@dime.cs.umass.edu> <12723@pitt.UUCP>
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In article <12723@pitt.UUCP> geb@dsl.pitt.edu (gordon e. banks) writes:
>In article <40677@dime.cs.umass.edu> yodaiken@chelm.cs.umass.edu (victor yodaiken) writes:
>
>>Now you seem to be retreating from your support of Friesen's strong
>>AI position. If all you are claiming is that "mind" is a product of
>>some physical phenomena connected with the brain, then we have no argument.
>>On the other hand, a claim that "mind" is a "computation" or a claim that
>>the fundamental principles of thought are understood, or a claim that
>>human minds can be characterized in the same way as the operation of slug
>>nervous systems can be characterized, but with just more connections, then 
>>we disagree.
>
>Perhaps we disagree on the meaning of the word "computation".  I consider
>that neural networks (real ones) being activated by internal and
>external stimuli are likely the basis for our "minds".  If this is
>a computation, then I guess I agree with Friesen.  The fact that

Generally, "computation" has to do with Turing machines or some variant. For
example, the preface to Martin Davis' book starts:
	This book is an introduction to the theory of computability and
	noncomputability, usually referred to as the theory of recursive
	functions.

Thus, if you argue that what neurons do is "computation", I will take it
that you believe that neurons act like digital computers or Turing machines.
Sometimes you seem to be defining "computation" as equivalent to 
"physical process", and this is quite a weaker statement. I'm not
convinced that "mind" is purely a product of neuronal activity, although
it seems possible, but I'm far more skeptical of a claim that "mind" is
a product of "computation" in the usual sense.  Note, that I do not have
to posit a supernatural force in either case: one can easily suppose that
there are mechanisms involving chemical transport, proteins, quantum
effects, radio waves, spinal cords, vocal chords, endocrine systems,
chaotic or statistical phenomena .... whatever, which are 
intimately involved in the production of self-consciousness and language. 
That is, my aim is not to suggest that mind is necessarily unknowable or
non-material, but to suggest that facile analogies between minds and
computers should not be taken too seriously and that premature  conclusions
about the nature of mental functioning be avoided.
There is no a priori reason to
believe that thoughts can arise from transistors, or that collections of
devices which mimic some of the electrical behavior of a neuron will be
sufficient to produce consciousness or even complex problem solving. We
can flap our hands up and down all day, but we still won't fly.

>another.  If we use phonon pumping in our neurons, it is a good bet
>that the worms do too.
>

We have abilities which are not present at all in worms: as mentioned
before, language seems to represent a radical step.




