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From: khorsell@ee.latrobe.edu.au (Kym Horsell)
Subject: Re: GA & iter. pris. dilemma w/ noise
Sender: news@lugb.latrobe.edu.au (News System)
Message-ID: <3s2pf6$hiv@laplace.ee.latrobe.edu.au>
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 1995 03:04:06 GMT
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References: <3rsog4$h07@decaxp.harvard.edu>
Organization: School of Electronic Engineering, La Trobe University

In article <3rsog4$h07@decaxp.harvard.edu>,
Carlo Martino <martino@fas.harvard.edu> wrote:
>Look for the title "Emergent Nastiness in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
>Games".  A lot of the paper is introductory stuff necessary in the context
>(oriented towards engineering) of the course, reviewing basic game
>theoretical approaches to I.P.D., as well as Axelrod's work.  People 
>already familiar with "Evolution of Cooperation" should skip ahead.

I've been enumerating all "Turing" machines of a given size to
determine optimal strategies both in "isolation" and within
stready-state populations (including the consideration that sometimes
the steady-state is not unique).

Certainly the "emergent nasiness" is perfectly consistent
with what I've found in the approx 20K-strategy playoff's I've solved. ;-)

-- 
R. Kym Horsell
khorsell@EE.Latrobe.EDU.AU              kym@CS.Binghamton.EDU 
