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From: gal2@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Jacob Galley)
Subject: Re: H Maturana's definition of life?
Message-ID: <1994Sep14.210612.28698@midway.uchicago.edu>
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Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 21:06:12 GMT
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pvh@slfoo.cybernet.za (Peter van Heusden) writes:
>With all the debate about a definiton of life going here... what do people 
>think of the definition offered by H Maturana in 'Autopoesis and cognition'? 

I have a paper explicating the idea of autopoiesis and nervous
cognition, "The Basic Organization of Nervous Activity and the
Cognized World", availible by ftp.  The first few pages would make a
good quick introduction to the theory.

 =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =  =

ABSTRACT: Vertebrates have evolved nervous systems with brains that
facilitate cognition of unparalleled adaptability, sensitivity and
speed.  In this paper I give a brief explanation of the organization and
function of the vertebrate nervous system, working from Maturana and
Varela's (1980) conceptual framework of ``autopoiesis''.  I then discuss
the implications of the neurophysiological research of Skarda and
Freeman (1987).  Finally, I will show that Mark Johnson's (1987) theory
of the structure of human experience is compatible with these biological
theories of cognition.  By explaining vertebrate cognition starting at
the neuronal level and working upward, I will indicate how it is
possible to correlate the immediate experience of the world with an
operational explanation of nervous activity.

This paper is availible by anonymous ftp at:

	trill.berkeley.edu

and the files are:

	pub/papers/ward/galley.dvi.Z
	pub/papers/ward/galley.ps.Z
	pub/papers/ward/galley.txt

Jake.

-- 
Any analysis of the very concept of explanation would, naturally, begin and 
end with a renunciation as to explaining our own conscious activity.
								<-- Niels Bohr
