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From: David@longley.demon.co.uk (David Longley)
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Subject: Re: Grounding Representations: ("Grounding" is the wrong word)
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Date: Tue, 25 Apr 1995 05:07:18 +0000
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> When challenged about their ability to talk about unicorns or events
> that occurred before they were born, or scientific unobservables, or
> mathematical abstractions, they tend to claim that somehow all these
> things can be defined in terms of words whose meanings are grounded
> in sensory contact. (As far as I know philosophers who have tried
> such conceptual reductionism in any detail have eventually admitted
> defeat.)
> 
> In a thermostat, and perhaps some simple organisms, the link between
> internal information store and and thing representated is very
> direct. In people the causal links are very indirect and the same
> sensors (and motors) are shared between huge numbers of different
> concepts, with many intermediate levels of processing between
> sensory transducers and states like beliefs.
> 
> The more indirect (and overloaded) the causal links between
> representations and referents, the more the meaning depends on
> structure not causation. In humans I believe structure dominates,
> and causal links serve merely to reduce ambiguity of reference
> (which can never be completely eliminated).
> 
> The structure of our internal information states is so rich, and the
> architecture that uses them is so complex that the bulk of human
> meaning comes from the interaction of structure and manipulation.
> 
> But I appreciate that what I've written is probably very unclear and
> very unconvincing. I must try to find a much better way to say it
> all.
> 
> Aaron Sloman, ( http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs )
> School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham, B15 2TT, England
> EMAIL   A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk  OR A.Sloman@bham.ac.uk
> Phone: +44-(0)121-414-4775       Fax:   +44-(0)121-414-4281
> 

I'd  like to see this related to Fodor's argument 'Methodoogical Solipsism 
as a Researcg Strategy in Cognitive Psychology' BBS, 1990, and the counter
position which Fodor identifies with Quine ('The Naturalists').

R.J Nelson made a contribution in this area not long ago, with 'Naming and
Reference', and I'd like to know how that has been received professionally
too.
-- 
David Longley
