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From: nfp5e@faraday.clas.Virginia.EDU (Nathan Piazza)
Subject: Re: Is I is or is I not or both or neither
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Date: Tue, 25 Apr 1995 05:29:29 GMT
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> 
> 
> Tom Ace responds:
> 
> I know that the above-mentioned logical problem is not enough to sway
> most people who for their own reasons believe in a non-physical mind or
> soul.  It alone wouldn't be enough for me, either.  There are other
> lines of inquiry--some ancient, some new--that suggest that the self 
> is a concept, a culturally-conditioned belief.

The logical problem you write of is not a problem of belief in
"soul".  It is only a problem given the assumptions of
dualistic Cartesian thought.  If you assume an objective
reality separate from mind, then, and only then is there a
logical problem with the reconciliation of the mind/body
problem.  Other philosophies such as monistic idealism or
Platonic idealism do not have such logical problems, although,
admittedly, they have problems resolving why we have the
perception of an objective reality.

--Nathan F. Piazza
