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From: vlsi_lib@netcom.com (Gerard Malecki)
Subject: Re: Searle vs. "Strong" AI
Message-ID: <vlsi_libD5IFJC.J6L@netcom.com>
Reply-To: shankar@vlibs.com
Organization: VLSI Libraries Incorporated
References: <D5D9Bu.6HC@news.cis.umn.edu> <3k5857$b90@tadpole.fc.hp.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 1995 01:45:11 GMT
Lines: 46
Sender: vlsi_lib@netcom3.netcom.com

In article <3k5857$b90@tadpole.fc.hp.com> allsop@fc.hp.com writes:
>
>	Check out this URL to the "Computationalist Manifesto" page:
>
>http://turing.pacss.binghamton.edu/dietrich/computationalist-manifesto.html
>
>	It contains some information about Eric Dietrich's great book
>_Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons_ which is on this topic.  It
>contains a bunch of great counter argument papers to Searle's
>position, the Chinese room arguments and the such.
>
>	The primary problem with most "computationalist" views is they
>don't recognize the significance of the phenomenal qualia we use for
>representations.  In fact many such as Dennett, take an
>"eliminativeist" position and deny that we have qualia altogether.  A
>register of transistors in a particular state can represent a binary
>number which in turn may represent red but this just isn't the same as
>the red quale we use to represent 750 nm light.  Anything capable of
>representation can do intelligent computation of differing degrees but
>today's computer representations are much less capable than the
>diverse and phenomenal qualia we experience and use to represent.  I
>believe this is what Searl is trying to say with his arguments but he
>misses the mark completely.  I pointed this out to Eric Dietrich in an
>e-mail message and he agreed with me.
>
>	Brent Allsop

Incidentally the red quale may have nothing to do with the physical red
light of 750 nm. For example, we can experience red in dreams as well as
in hallucinations. Also, however complex your computer representation
may be, there is no way of telling if what *you* represent to be red is
not actually blue and vice-versa. Because no mathematical formalism 
describes quales. Also, by definition, anything that experiences quales
is conscious. 

Incidentally, to model a "stream of consciousness", you would require a
phenomenal number of bits. Even to model just the quales experienced due
to physical factors (as opposed to mental states), you would need to take
into account not just sight and sound, but also every possible physical
sensation possible (smell, taste, touch, pain, nausea, acceleration, etc.,
etc.). Even the "virtual reality" systems today are nowhere close. 
However dreams and hallucinations do offer a rich set of quales.

Shankar Ramakrishnan
shankar@vlibs.com

