Reducing
Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design via Machine
Learning.
With Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartline, and Yishay Mansour. Journal of
Computer and System Sciences 2007, special issue on Learning Theory
(invited).
[view
abstract]
In this
work, we make an explicit connection between machine learning and
mechanism design. In doing so, we obtain a unified approach for
considering a variety of profit maximizing mechanism design problems,
including many that have been previously considered in the literature.
In particular, we use techniques from Sample Complexity in machine
learning theory to reduce problems of incentive compatible mechanism
design to standard algorithmic questions. We apply these results to a
wide
variety of revenue maximizing pricing problems, including the problem
of
auctioning a digital good, the attribute auction problem, and the
problem of item pricing in unlimited supply combinatorial auctions.
It is worth noting that from a learning perspective, these settings
present several unique challenges: the loss function is discontinuous
and
asymmetric, and the range of bidders' valuations may be large.
A preliminary version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of the
46th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) 2005,
under the title Mechanism
Design via Machine Learning .
A related paper on Sponsored
Search Auction
Design via Machine Learning appears in the Workshop
on Sponsored Search Auctions, 2005.